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Abstract
Deep Neural Networks for image classification have
been found to be vulnerable to adversarial samples,
which consist of sub-perceptual noise added to a benign
image that can easily fool trained neural networks, pos-
ing a significant risk to their commercial deployment.
In this work, we analyze adversarial samples through
the lens of their contributions to the principal compo-
nents of each image, which is different than prior works
in which authors performed PCA on the entire dataset.
We investigate a number of state-of-the-art deep neural
networks trained on ImageNet as well as several attacks
for each of the networks. Our results demonstrate em-
pirically that adversarial samples across several attacks
have similar properties in their contributions to the prin-
cipal components of neural network inputs. We propose
a new metric for neural networks to measure their ro-
bustness to adversarial samples, termed the (k, p) point.
We utilize this metric to achieve 93.36% accuracy in de-
tecting adversarial samples independent of architecture
and attack type for models trained on ImageNet.
Introduction
Artificial Neural Networks have made a resurgence in recent
times and have achieved state of the art results on numer-
ous tasks such as image classification (Russakovsky et al.
2015). As their popularity rises the investigation of their se-
curity will become ever more relevant. Adversarial examples
in particular - which involve small, tailored changes to the
input to make the neural network misclassify it - pose a seri-
ous threat to the safe utilization of neural networks. Recent
works have shown that adversarial samples comprise of non-
robust features of datasets, and that neural networks trained
on adversarial samples can generalize to the test set (Ilyas
et al. 2019). Because these non-robust features are invisible
for humans, performing inference on lossy reconstructions
of the adversarial input has the potential to shed light on
the dependence between the adversarial noise and the robust
features of the image.
In this work, we seek to analyze adversarial samples in
terms of their contribution to the principal components of an
image and characterize the vulnerability of these models. We
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test our method for a number of different Deep Neural Net-
work architectures, datasets and attack types, and identify a
general trend about adversarial samples.
Background and Prior Work
Adversarial Samples
We consider a neural network f(·) used for classification
where f(x)i represents the probability that image x corre-
sponds to class i. Images are represented as x ∈ [0, 1]w.h.c,
where w, h, c are the width, height and number of channels
of the image. We denote the classification of the network
as c(x) = argmaxi f(x)i, with c
∗(x) representing the true
class, or the ground truth of the image. Given an image x
and an image classifier f(·), an adversarial sample x′ fol-
lows two properties:
• D(x, x′) is small for some distance metric D, implying
that the images x and x′ appear visually similar to hu-
mans.
• c(x′) 6= c∗(x) = c(x). This means that the prediction on
the adversarial sample is incorrect whereas the original
prediction is correct.
In this work, we focus on 3 methods to generate adversarial
samples.
DeepFool. Deepfool (Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi, and
Frossard 2016) is an iterative untargeted attack technique
to manipulate the decision boundaries of neural networks
while minimizing the L2 distance metric between the
altered (adversarial) example and the original image.
Jacobian Saliency Map Attack: Papernot et al. intro-
duced the Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (Papernot et
al. 2016), a targeted attack optimized under the L0 distance.
The attack is a greedy algorithm that utilizes the saliency
map of neural networks to pick pixels to modify one at a
time, increasing the target classification on each iteration.
Carlini Wagner Attack. For a given image, the goal of
the Carlini Wagner attack (Carlini and Wagner 2017) is
to find a small perturbation such that the model misclas-
sifies the input as a chosen adversarial class. The attack
can be formulated as the following optimization problem:
min||δ||p + c · f(x + δ) such that x + δ ∈ [0, 1]n where
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||δ||p is the p-norm. In this paper we use the L2 norm i.e.
p = 2.
Prior Work
There have been several prior works in detecting adver-
sarial samples. DeepFense(Rouhani et al. 2018) formalizes
the goal of thwarting adversarial attacks as an optimization
problem that minimizes the rarely observed regions in the
latent feature space spanned by a neural network. (Pang et
al. 2018) seek to minimize the reverse cross-entropy which
encourage deep networks to learn latent representations that
better distinguish adversarial examples from normal ones.
(Ma et al. 2019) identify exploitation channels and utilize
them for adversarial sample detection.
Our work is most similar to (Ma et al. 2018), which char-
acterizes adversarial samples in terms of the Local Intrin-
sic Dimensionality, and to (Carlini and Wagner 2017) and
(Bhagoji, Cullina, and Mittal 2017), which show PCA to be
an effective defense against certain adversarial attacks on
smaller datasets such as MNIST. Our method, however, is
different in that we seek to understand adversarial samples
based on their contributions to the principal components of
a single image, and that we use the rows as principal com-
ponents, thereby allowing us to scale our technique to much
larger datasets such as ImageNet.
Methodology
Threat Model
There are two different settings for adversarial attacks. The
most general setting is the black box threat model where ad-
versaries do not have access to any information about the
neural network (e.g. gradient) except for the predictions of
the network. In the white box threat model all information
about the neural network is accessible, including its weights,
architecture, gradients and training method. In this work we
consider situations where adversaries have white-box access
to the neural network.
Defensive PCA
(Carlini and Wagner 2017) and (Bhagoji, Cullina, and Mit-
tal 2017) have shown PCA to be an effective defense against
certain adversarial attacks on smaller datasets, where n is the
number of samples in the dataset and d the number of fea-
tures (rows × columns) of each sample. This works well
when the dataset and number of features are small, however,
for larger datasets with larger inputs this method becomes
computationally inefficient as the size of the data matrix
scales quadratically with the size of dataset.
To tackle this emerging problem we suggest an alternative
way to perform PCA, where n = w is the number of rows
and d = h× c is the product of the number of columns and
the channels of an image x ∈ [0, 1]w.h.c. In doing so we
can capture the correlations between pixels of an image and
vastly reduce the number of dimensions required for PCA.
Additionally, this method is independent of the dataset size.
Furthermore, our method also has the added advantage that
it requires no knowledge of the dataset which makes it more
versatile.
We term this new method of performing PCA as rowPCA
denoted as C = Prow(x) for an input image x ∈ [0, 1]w.h.c,
which treats each h × c row of x as a principal axis. As an
example, an ImageNet input image x with dimensionality
(224 × 224 × 3) will generate 224 principal components.
We can then reconstruct our image x from the principal
components with smaller components contributing smaller
variance to the image. We denote the first i principal com-
ponents [c1, c2, ...ci] as C1:i, and the image reconstruction
operation as Pinv,row(·). The reconstructed image x∗ gen-
erated from the first i row principal components is thus
x∗ = Pinv,row(C1:i). Figure 1 shows several reconstructed
inputs for a benign sample.
Original k=3 k=4 k=5
k=6 k=7 k=8 k=9
k=10 k=11 k=12 k=13
k=14 k=15 k=16 k=17
k=18 k=19 k=20 k=21
Figure 1: Examples of PCA reconstructed images for a ran-
domly chosen image from the ImageNet validation dataset.
Detecting Dominant Classes
We define the dominant class as the predicted class on the
full image x. The (k, p) point is defined as a tuple consisting
of the component when the dominant class starts becoming
the top prediction and the softmax probability p of the dom-
inant class at that particular component number. Algorithm
1 outlines the procedure to obtain the (k, p) point for a par-
ticular input, and Figure 2 demonstrates the functionality of
our detection method on an adversarial sample. The steps
that occur are:
• The input image is decomposed into its principal compo-
nents by the rows.
• Each of the sets C1:k of descending principal components
(sorted by by eigenvalue) is used to reconstruct the image.
• Each reconstructed image is fed through the neural net-
work and the predictions are observed.
• The (k, p) point is found for the particular set of predic-
tions for each image and is subsequently used to deter-
mine whether that particular sample is adversarial or be-
nign.
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Figure 2: Visualization of defensive PCA applied to an ad-
versarial input. For an input image, we reconstruct the im-
age from the principal components and perform inference on
each to determine the component when the dominant class
starts becoming the top prediction. The dominant class could
be the adversarial class for adversarial inputs, or the ground
truth or misclassified class for benign inputs.
Algorithm 1: Finding the (k, p) point for a given neural
network f(·), input image x, top scoring class on input
image c(x), and maximum number of principal compo-
nents n. We reconstruct the image from components 1
through i and find the point at which the dominant class
is no longer dominant.
Result: (k, p) point
1 begin:
2 k = n;
3 topper = argmaxf(x)
4 while topper == c(x) do
5 k = k − 1;
6 x∗ = Pinv,row(C1:k)
7 topper = argmaxf(x∗)
8 p = p(x∗)[topper]
9 return(k, p)
Experiments
Experimental Setup
Datasets and Models: We evaluated our method on neu-
ral networks pre-trained on the ImageNet dataset (Deng et
al. 2009) in PyTorch, namely Inception-v3, (Szegedy et al.
2016), Resnet-50 (He et al. 2016),and VGG19 (Simonyan
and Zisserman 2014).
Attack methods: For each of the models we evaluated our
method on the DeepFool (Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi, and
Frossard 2016), Jacobian Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) (Pa-
pernot et al. 2016) and Carlini-Wagner L2 attack (Carlini
and Wagner 2017) using the Foolbox library (Rauber, Bren-
del, and Bethge 2017). For each of the 9 (attack, model)
pairs, we generated 100 adversarial images.
Results
Behavior of adversarial samples. Figures 3a, 3b and 3c
shows the clustering of adversarial samples in similar re-
gions of the (k, p) space, while figure 3d shows the cluster-
ing of benign samples in similar regions of the (k, p) space.
Figure 4 shows the (k, p) points of all the adversarial and
benign points, demonstrating their separability.
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Figure 3: (k, p) points for adversarial and benign samples
for ImageNet trained models.
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Figure 4: (k, p) points for all benign and adversarial Ima-
geNet samples for all models and adversarial attacks.
Detection of adversarial samples We train binary clas-
sifiers on the (k, p) points for a fixed (attack,model) pair
and evaluate them against points from the same pair as well
as adversarial samples derived using other attacks targeted
towards different architectures.
• Intra-model detection rate: Given a (attack, model)
pair, this metric measures the probability of predicting
whether a given (k, p) point is either a benign or adver-
sarial sample. We gathered 128 correctly-predicted be-
nign samples and 100 adversarial points for each (attack,
model) pair for the ImageNet dataset and used an Ad-
aBoost (Freund and Schapire 1999) classifier with 200
weak Decision Tree estimators to distinguish between the
two. We achieve an average prediction rate of 94.81%,
namely that we can correctly predict whether a sample
for a given neural network will be adversarial or benign
94.81% of the time.
• Inter-model detection rate: We observe the (k, p) distri-
butions of adversarial samples across all attack types and
models in order to determine their similarity. To measure
this, we train classifiers trained on one (attack, model) pair
and evaluate them on benign and adversarial samples for
every other (attack, model) pair, as demonstrated in Fig-
ure 5. We achieve an average adversarial detection rate of
93.36% across all architectures and adversarial methods.
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Figure 5: Inter-model and Intra-model adversarial sample
detection. We achieve near perfect prediction rates for sim-
ple discriminative models trained to identify adversarial
samples from one (attack, model) pair and evaluated on a
different one. The y axis represents the (attack, model) we
trained our classifier to identify, and the x axis represents the
(attack, model) we evaluated our classifier on.
Discussion
PCA is one of numerous linear methods for dimensionality
reduction of neural network inputs. Other techniques such
as Sparse Dictionary Learning and Local Linear Embedding
are potential alternatives to PCA, which we intend on explor-
ing in future work. One particular limitation of our method is
the need for many rows in the input, which would make our
defense inapplicable to inputs for smaller neural networks.
Conclusion
We identify a new metric, the (k, p) point, to analyze adver-
sarial samples in terms of their contributions to the principal
components of an image. We demonstrate empirically that
the (k, p) points of benign and adversarial samples are dis-
tinguishable across adversarial attacks and neural network
architectures and are an underlying property of the dataset
itself. We train a binary classifier to detect adversarial sam-
ples and achieve a 93.36% detection success rate.
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